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Social and economic infrastructure are essential for economic development. However,
over the last three decades, many infrastructure projects in developing countries have failed.
These failures raise the question as to the role of governments in the provision, and longevity,
of much needed infrastructure. In this paper, we seek to examine the significance of govern-
ments’ residual ownership in determining the failure of infrastructure projects that started
as Public-Private Partnerships (PPP). We utilise duration analysis to analyse 2,721 PPP
projects across six regions globally and find that assigning the residual ownership of infras-
tructure projects to the government reduces the probability of project failure. It may be the
case that assigning the risk of residual ownership to governments makes the project more
affordable to end users. We also find that both project size and sector play an important
role in determining the probability of project failure. These findings provide policy insights
and highlights issues around the way infrastructure projects in developing countries are ne-
gotiated between the private sector and governments.
Keywords: Public-Private Partnerships; Residual ownership; Survival analysis;
Infrastructure project failure; Development policy.
JEL codes: H54, H82, O21, O18.
∗Corresponding author. Email: S.Coleman@lboro.ac.uk. Tel: +44(0)1509228850.
1
         
Residual Government Ownership in Public-Private
Partnership Projects
Alhassan Mansaraya, Simeon Coleman ∗,c, Ali Ataullahb, and Kavita Sirichandc
aFiscal Risk Management and State-owned Enterprises Oversight Division, Ministry of Finance, Sierra
Leone.
bThe Faculty of Business and Law, The Open University Business School, Department for Accounting
and Finance, UK.
cSchool of Business and Economics, Loughborough University, Loughborough, LE11 3TU, UK.
Abstract
Social and economic infrastructure are essential for economic development. However,
over the last three decades, many infrastructure projects in developing countries have failed.
These failures raise the question as to the role of governments in the provision, and longevity,
of much needed infrastructure. In this paper, we seek to examine the significance of govern-
ments’ residual ownership in determining the failure of infrastructure projects that started
as Public-Private Partnerships (PPP). We utilise duration analysis to analyse 2,721 PPP
projects across six regions globally and find that assigning the residual ownership of infras-
tructure projects to the government reduces the probability of project failure. It may be the
case that assigning the risk of residual ownership to governments makes the project more
affordable to end users. We also find that both project size and sector play an important
role in determining the probability of project failure. These findings provide policy insights
and highlights issues around the way infrastructure projects in developing countries are ne-
gotiated between the private sector and governments.
Keywords: Public-Private Partnerships; Residual ownership; Survival analysis;
Infrastructure project failure; Development policy.
JEL codes: H54, H82, O21, O18.
∗Corresponding author. Email: S.Coleman@lboro.ac.uk. Tel: +44(0)1509228850.
1
         
1 Introduction
Building on seminal work, particularly Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) and Murphy et al. (1989), many
in the development and policy community advocate a ‘big push’ to help low-income countries
escape poverty (e.g., Sachs et al. 2004, Collier 2006). Although these calls propose a variety of
policies, virtually all of them lay emphasis on the importance of good governance and infrastruc-
ture. Starting with the work of Aschauer (1989), as well as in policy debates (e.g., World Bank
1994, 2019), adequate supply of infrastructure by governments has long been viewed as indispens-
able for long-term and sustainable economic development, for job creation, poverty reduction and
improved welfare, even in the short-term.
In light of increasing demand for infrastructure for economic development, coupled with the
limited resources and skills to build, maintain, and repair these facilities, Public-Private Partner-
ships (PPPs) are increasingly being adopted by governments to deliver new infrastructure. Al-
though the net contribution of PPPs is a controversial issue, there is sufficient evidence supporting
its relevance in infrastructure development and related service delivery, particularly in developing
countries facing significant infrastructure deficits. More specifically, the terms of engagement that
come with PPPs are becoming increasingly important, both politically and economically. Ideally,
to obtain infrastructure investments aimed at promoting economic development and for sustain-
able development, developing country governments need to secure investment terms that will not
saddle the country with net negative benefits. This underscores the crucial role of government in
this process of economic management.
The 2017 Global Infrastructure Outlook reports a $15 trillion infrastructure investment gap
i.e. between a projected $79 trillion investment and the $94 trillion required for adequate global
infrastructure by 2040, 19% higher than would be delivered under current trends, with Africa
and Asia accounting for $6.3 trillion of this shortfall, and the biggest gaps being in Energy and
Road Transport.1 Efficiency gains associated with the PPP mode of procurement relative to
traditional methods have been compared in some fairly recent literature (see Buso et al., 2017;
Byoun et al., 2013).2 However, Residual Value Risk (RVR) is also a critical concern if projects
revert to the public sector, and developing countries cannot afford to have such risks added to
their existing socio-economic problems.3 Despite the need for infrastructure development, RVR
becomes instrumental for whether the PPP investment will take place at all. This has not yet
been thoroughly studied within the context of economic development, and is a gap this study
aims to address. Many commentators focus on ‘financing’ for plugging the gap, in an overtaxed
and over-borrowed world, but affordability is crucial.
Further, PPP failures can have important deleterious implications, particularly for developing
countries since such failures often impair governments’ ability to provide socio-economic infras-
tructure vital for economic growth (Röller and Waverman, 2001), poverty reduction, and also
prevention of conflicts (Beall et al., 2013). Intuitively, even the anticipation of failure could deter
private investors from engaging in PPPs or, at best, lead to requirement of excessive premiums
as a prerequisite, both of which are costly for the host country. The relevance of such failures
should not be underestimated, and is a motivation for this study.
We analyze a sample of 2721 PPP projects implemented between 1986 and 2015, as reported
by the World Bank. In our sample, the monetary value (number) of projects that failed was
approximately US$78 billion (253), while the monetary value (number) of successfully completed
projects was around US$60 billion (181). We define project failure as a deviation of the PPP
1See Global Infrastructure (GI) Outlook 2017 Report.
2In the traditional method of procurement, the government contracts the private sector for the delivery of
public services through competitive tendering under several contracts including, design, construction and operation
contracts. Meanwhile, PPP bundles investment, construction and service provision into a single long-term contract,
thus bringing greater efficiency in the process (see Engel et al., 2013).
3According to HM Treasury, ‘Residual Value Risk’ refers to the uncertainty as to what the residual value will
prove to be at the expiry of the PPP project.
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project outcome from its original conceptualisation by the partners. Against this background,
and noting developing country governments’ need for PPP infrastructure investment for economic
growth and development, plus the deleterious costs of failure, this study aims to investigate and
posit on a central question: How should PPP projects be structured to mitigate the risk of failure?
The role of government is central here since, we argue, governments’ role in residual ownership can
impact project survival. We build on the incomplete contracting literature to derive a hypothesis
linking the risk of PPP project failure to the ownership of residual facilities. We then test this
hypothesis using our sample of PPP projects from 114 low- and middle-income countries across
six regions around the world. In our analysis, residual facility ownership refers to the ownership
of the residual facility of the PPP project at the expiry of the contract.
Intuitively, PPP ownership will incentivise the owner if expected residual value is positive
(see Aghion and Holden, 2011). However, since residual value is unknown when entering into
a PPP contract, RVR may be costed and incorporated ex-ante into the overall project cost.
The net benefits of PPP projects, which have the average age of around 30 years (see Iossa and
Martimort, 2015), are uncertain. Residual owner(s) are therefore exposed to RVR and, as is often
the case, where the partners’ investments are unverifiable, profit will be the likely motivation for
the private partner. Therefore, transfer of residual ownership to the private partner could, ceteris
paribus, lead to an increase in the required risk premium and hence, the project cost, making it
less-affordable to the poor which is often cited as a catalyst for the failure of many PPP projects
because long-term charges must be within the end-users’ budget. However, such increased costs
could be mitigated if ownership is conferred on the public sector, whose objectives should be
public welfare, rather than profit maximization.4 Within this context, we provide a novel finding
that suggests that the survival of PPP projects, including development-enhancing infrastructure,
can be greatly enhanced if they are structured to confer residual facility ownership to the public
sector, rather than the private sector.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents some relevant back-
ground theory and highlights some relevant evidence in the extant literature. Sections 3 describes
the data and empirical methods employed, while Section 4 reports our empirical results and a
discussion of the results. Section 5 concludes with a summary and some policy recommendations.
2 Theory and Evidence
Notwithstanding associated challenges, PPPs are considered by many governments and inter-
national institutions, such as the World Bank, as a preferable option to accelerate delivery of
infrastructure and related services to spur infrastructure provision. Governments’ re-election mo-
tives cannot also be ruled out. These underscore the relevance of PPP for practitioners, academics
and policy-makers vis-à-vis economic development. To this end, data-driven research to uncover
evidence on how the survival of PPP projects can be enhanced in relation to how projects are
structured is crucial. Further, there is a need to link theories on residual ownership in PPP project
arrangements with empirical outcomes.
2.1 PPPs: A brief overview
Although the World Bank Public Private Partnerships website provides a comprehensive detail,
a brief overview is instructive.5
PPPs are typically classified as ‘Greenfield’ (collaboration between the public and private
sector for the development of an entirely new facility) or ‘Brownfield’ (collaboration for the re-
4This could be one possible reason that although the UK government specified the conditions for residual
ownership allocation, its preferred option, however, is an automatic transfer of the residual facilities to the public
sector at the end of the contract (see Bennett and Iossa, 2006).
5See World Bank Public Private Partnerships website.
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habilitation and/or expansion of an existing facility). Greenfield PPP projects are generally
structured as build, operate and transfer (BOT), which confers residual ownership of the facility
to the public sector, or build, operate and own (BOO), which allows the private partner to retain
the residual facility.
• Build, Operate and Transfer (BOT) a these typically allow the private partner to develop
a brand-new facility, operate and maintain the facility over a period agreed with the public
partner (normally referred to as the concession period), and later transfer the facility to the
public partner. The public partner has the obligation to purchase either the infrastructure
created or the services emanating thereof during the concession period.
• Build, Operate and Own (BOO) – these allow the private partner to develop the facility,
operate and maintain the facility and at the end of the concession period, retains the facility.
In this case, the residual ownership of the facility goes to the private partner.
Since PPP projects are usually financed on a non-recourse basis, the liabilities of the partners
are limited to the facility created. To implement a PPP project, after all feasibilities and re-
cruitment of the private partner has been concluded, the partners normally enter into a purchase
agreement. Specifically, a special purpose vehicle (SPV) is formed, typically by the private part-
ner (referred to as the sponsor) to source debt financing and issue out contracts and, in providing
financing to the SPV, the creditors normally ask for a direct agreement to be signed with the
public partner/Government, giving them the right to step-in and take ownership/control of the
facility in the event of payment default.
In the case of Brownfield projects, the private partner is normally required to rehabilitate and
operate the facility and later transfer it to the public partner i.e., such arrangements are referred
to as rehabilitate, operate and transfer (ROT). In other cases, the private partner is expected to
create a new facility in addition to the existing facility i.e., build, rehabilitate, operate and transfer
(BROT). For Brownfield projects, it is hardly the case that the residual facility is retained by the
private partner.6 Given the aims of this study i.e., analysing residual ownership and whether it
matters for project survival, our focus is on ’Greenfield projects’.
In terms of how the output price is typically set for typical PPP projects, the process begins
at the negotiations stage. At this stage, the private partner, in collaboration with the public
partner, develops a financial model that incorporates the costs to the parties, debt and equity, as
well as the debt and dividend payments. These costs are then spread over the concession period
to determine the tariff or per unit price of the output to be paid by the public partner i.e., the
buyer/off-taker’s tariff. For example, the public partner could be asked to pay a tariff of 10 US
cents/kWh in a power project. The public partner in turn computes the cost of distributing the
power to the end-user and develops an end-user tariff, say 11 US cents/kWh.
Clearly, bargaining power is crucial in allocating risks between parties in PPP transactions,
as well as in the determination of the output tariff (price). Several factors come into play in
determining a party’s bargaining power in PPPs. These include previous experience, time taken
to conclude negotiations and the options available to the party. As noted by Svejnar (1986),
a party with no bargaining power is more likely to receive an adverse pay-off corresponding to
the disagreement outcome. In PPPs, the key role of government is underscored by the fact that
PPP output tariffs are normally higher for countries that lack experience in PPP negotiations,
have serious infrastructure deficits, weak regulatory frameworks, poor governance structures and
significant fiscal challenges.
6See the World Bank Private Participation Infrastructure database ’Glossary of Terms’ section for additional
information.
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2.2 Infrastructure and economic growth
Some theoretical justifications for policies promoting infrastructure investment are found in the
economic growth literature. Typically, the generic framework follows an aggregate production
function, where real aggregate output (Q) is a function of a range of variables.7 In brief:
Q = A(θ, Inf).F (NonInf, L,B(Inf)) (1)
where NonInf is the non-infrastructure aggregate capital stock, Inf the infrastructure capital
stock, L is the aggregate hours worked by the labour force. A(.) is a standard productivity
term, which incorporates generic efficiency-enhancing externalities, represented by θ, which can
be interpreted as the ‘indirect’ effect of infrastructure. The theory also notes that Inf enters the
production function F(.) through a function B(Inf ) which allows Equation 1 to accommodate
situations where infrastructure is considered simply as an additional factor of production i.e.
B(Inf )=Inf, as is often done in the macro literature (see for example, Romp and de Haan, 2005).
The formulation also addresses the assumption that the stock of infrastructure has pure public
good attributes and produces services in a non-rival and non-excludable way. B(Inf ) may be
termed as the ‘direct’ effect of Inf on Q.
In terms of direct channels, infrastructure promotes economic growth by providing access
to certain remote areas, roads or bridges that facilitate private investment required for growth.
Entrepreneurship, for example, is likely to be enhanced through access to certain services such as
electricity and/or telecommunications investments in critical parts of infrastructure networks and
enables corresponding private investment. The theory notes, however, that the way infrastructure
investments are financed may be non-neutral and there is the risk of a crowding-out effect on
private investment, especially if these investments are financed through taxation or borrowing
on domestic financial markets. In terms of indirect channels, infrastructure promotes economic
growth through maintenance and private capital durability. It is plausible that infrastructure
policy is biased toward the realization of new investments with less attention being paid to the
detriment of the maintenance of the existing stock. This may be due to the political visibility
of new investments and the fact that new investments often rely on low-interest international
loans, which are more attractive to politicians as long as they do not have too many strings
attached (see Rioja, 2003). Others include Adjustment costs where improvements in the stock
of infrastructure capital are likely to reduce private capital adjustment costs (see Agénor and
Moreno-Dodson, 2006); Improvemens in Labour Productivity through reduction in time wasted
commuting to work and stress, less off-sick days, improved efficiency in organizing work time due
to improved information and communication technology and learning by doing; Improvements in
Human Capital as highlighted by Galiani et al., (2005), in the short term by making existing
stock of human capital more effective, and in the medium and long term by inducing additional
investment in education; and finally Economies of Scale and Scope, where for example, better
transport infrastructure lowers transport costs and leads to economies of scale, better inventory
management. According to the theory, therefore, the importance of infrastructure for economic
growth is highlighted.
Having established the relevance of infrastructure for economic growth, the question then arises
as to how residual ownership of PPP projects impact the likelihood of success or failure of PPP
projects. Its practical implications for complementing or impeding economic development can be
significant, and the potential residual ownership implications for project survival is a motivation
for this study.
7See Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2005) and Agénor and Moreno-Dodson (2006) who discuss and model several
channels through which infrastructure may affect growth.
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2.3 Incomplete contracting and PPPs
A popular theoretical proposition for risk allocation and the ownership of residual facility in
PPPs is the Theory of Incomplete Contracting (TIC), which attempts to explain the so-called
‘hold-up’ problem emanating from the opportunistic behaviour of a contracting party during ex-
post renegotiation due to the inability of the parties to write a complete contract ex-ante that
will capture all possible contingencies (see Grossman and Hart (1986)). The basic tenet of the
TIC is that economic agents are boundedly rational and cannot anticipate ex-ante all possible
contingencies in a relationship. Therefore, they may write contracts that specify only the possible
known contingencies and later on when the state of nature is realised, they can renegotiate to
fill in the additional details. The main problem with this gap-filling solution relates to incentive-
compatibility, i.e., whether or not the economic agents have the propensity to be truthful in their
dealings during ex-post renegotiations. Clearly, in such high investment projects, importance of
this in investment decisions can be significant. In fact, most developing countries have generally
not been able to establish credible regulatory bodies because of governments’ inability to commit
e.g., the concessions granted to private operators following the divestiture of Latin-American
public firms were renegotiated after an average of only 2.1 years (see Guasch 2004).
Following seminal works by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1988) (hereafter
collectively referred to as GHM) on the TIC, the role of residual ownership on the outcomes
of relationship-specific investments, such as PPPs garnered interest. Dewatripont and Legros
(2005), however, highlight the problem of incentive compatibility i.e., whether or not the eco-
nomic agents have the propensity to be truthful in their dealings during ex-post renegotiations.
They highlight that incomplete contracts typically fail to fully protect economic agents against
opportunistic behaviour, as it is difficult for third-parties to distinguish between good- and bad-
faith renegotiation demands. According to Rogerson (1992, p. 777), a hold-up problem occurs
when two factors are present. First, parties to a future transaction must make non-contractible
specific investments prior to the transaction in order to prepare for it. Second, the exact form
of the optimal transaction (e.g., how many units if any, what quality level, the time of delivery)
cannot be specified with certainty ex-ante. To address the possible hold-up problem associated
with incentive-compatibility, GHM suggest that when economic agents enter into a relationship
in which the asset will be used to generate income, the agents can, in principle, contractually
specify exactly who will have control over the asset during the contract period. In doing so, the
authors focus on the ownership of residual rights (or the residual facilities) during the contract
period in a two-period model of integration of two parties where the product emanating from the
relationship is a private good. Besley and Ghatak (2001) extended GHM’s model to evaluate the
PPP framework for the production of a public good. They argue that if the value created by the
investment of the partners constitute a public good then the partner with the highest valuation
should be the owner of the residual facilities or have the control rights during the contract period
irrespective of the relative importance of their investments or other aspects of the production
technology. Francesconi and Muthoo (2011) extended the model further by considering public
good in terms of the degree to which it can be classified as a public good and posit on who should
then control the residual rights based on this classification and the level of investment. It follows
from this theory that efficient assignment of rights, including risks, depends on the type of good
or value generated as well as the choice or attributes of the parties entering into the partnership.
Building on these earlier developments, developed a three-period model in an attempt to capture
the role of residual facilities ownership at the expiry of the contract period and beyond. They
conclude that ownership of the facility at contract expiration has an important role to play in
incentivising partners’ ex-ante investments for the maximisation of their joint surplus. Bennett
and Iossa (2006) posit that the argument in favour of residual ownership by the private sector
partner is strengthened when it is assumed that the partners’ investments are unverifiable, con-
sistent with the GHM model, in which case there can be no bargaining over the implementation
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of innovation, and thus the private sector partner is only motivated by concern for her own profit.
As the residual ownership net effect is unknown a priori, the extant literature highlights the
risk associated with residual ownership - the so-called Residual Value Risk. Given the large
number of PPP project failures, a crucial question for both practitioners and policy-makers, is
how PPP residual facility ownership affects risk of failure (or enhances survival). Based on the
above, our analyses assumes that survival of PPP projects is influenced by the cost associated
with residual facilities ownership.
2.4 Testable hypotheses
On the one hand, if the residual facility ownership is conferred ex-ante on the private sector
partner, given that this partner is motivated by concern for own profit, a premium will be included
for the associated RVR and such costs will be incorporated ex-ante into the overall project cost.
The ensuing increase in the overall project cost reduces affordability of the project output by end-
users (if the project output is sold directly to end-users) and/or the fiscus (if the government is
paying). On the other hand, if residual ownership is conferred on the public sector partner, given
the assumed welfare-maximisation objective of governments, it is likely that the cost associated
with the RVR will not be translated ex-ante into the overall project cost, thus reducing the present
value of the tariff burden on end-users and/or the government fiscus.
To account for possible endogeneity in the relationship between residual facility ownership and
the risk of PPP projects failure, and to understand how PPP project survival relates to other
substantive predictors commonly used in the literature (e.g., Buso et al., 2017; De Vries and
Yehoue, 2013), we consider some control variables, including (i) size of project, (ii) participation
of multilateral institution(s) in project arrangement and (iii) the participation of local sponsor(s)
in the project arrangement in our empirical modelling. The rationale for these controls is as
follows.
First, larger projects are typically more expensive; and this high cost is likely to be translated
into the project output tariff, thereby reducing affordability for end-users and/or the government
fiscus. Davis (1996) suggests that aside from the ability to pay for the project output, the
willingness by the state and/or end-users to pay, because of an unreasonably high tariff, could
affect the survival of the project.8 Byoun et al., (2013) note that project size can also increase
project risk if the high-profile nature of a large project draws more attention from the local
government, which might in turn increase the probability of the local government taking an
adverse action. So, we test whether, ceteris paribus, small sized PPP projects are likely to have
a lower risk of failure than large-sized projects.
Second, multilateral institutions, such as the World Bank (WB), the International Finance
Corporation (IFC) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), have
been active in PPP implementation across the world. Byoun et al., (2013) suggest that partici-
pation of these institutions in PPP arrangements can mitigate the effects of adverse government
actions and provide political risk insurance to protect sponsors (equity holders) against the risks
of capital controls, expropriation, or other adverse and unexpected political events. In short, the
participation of these institutions, particularly in the provision of guarantees, could have cost-
reducing effects, as well as enhancing smooth implementation of PPP projects. In general, these
institutions can participate at several levels of the project cycle, including (i) Financial - provision
of loans to the project and taking direct equity interest in the project (ii) Provision of Guarantees
- partial risk guarantee and political risk guarantees (iii) Risk Management Support - Some mul-
tilateral institutions provide currency hedging as well as interest rate risk management facilities
for PPP projects (iv) Providing Advisory Services - multilateral institution also provide advisory
8A classic example being the Dabhol Power project in Maharastra, India, where both the off-taker (the Maharas-
tra State Electricity Board (MSEB)) and the Federal Government of India “wilfully” defaulted on their guarantees
under the project due to a high output tariff in the midst of an output glut, resulting from an oversized project.
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services at different levels of project implementation. So, we test whether, ceteris paribus, PPP
projects with the participation of multilateral institutions are likely to have lower risk of failure
than those without.
Third, given that some investors could receive part or all of their investment proceeds in local
currency. Foreign exchange pressure on the projects can contribute significantly to the failure of
PPP projects, as occurred in the 1990s (see Estache (2003)). We test whether, ceteris paribus,
PPP projects with the participation of local sponsor(s) are likely to have lower risk of failure
than those without. Fourth, following Buso et al., (2017) as well as the joint World Bank and
International Monetary Fund (IMF) debt sustainability framework for low and middle income
countries, public debt burden is captured through stock/solvency and flows/liquidity indicators.
The solvency indicator often employed is the public and publicly guaranteed (PPG) debt as a
percentage of nominal GDP (DstockGDP), which attempts to capture governments’ ability to
meet all long-term external debt obligations. So, we test whether, ceteris paribus, the higher
the government revenue, the lower the likelihood of the risk of PPP project failure. In addition,
we investigate whether, ceteris paribus, the lower the public sector debt burden, the lower the
likelihood of risk of PPP project failure.
Fifth, both inflation and exchange rates have been linked to variables that directly affect PPP
output tariff and hence, affordability and/or the fiscus); Osei-Kyei and Chan, (2015) also highlight
the importance of output demand for PPP project survival. We therefore investigate whether,
ceteris paribus, higher levels of inflation rate and exchange rate depreciation increase the likelihood
of PPP project failure. Finally, some studies including Singh and Jun, (1995) have emphasised the
role of political stability in the decision-making process and risk of failure of long-term investments
such as PPPs. Countries with a high propensity for violence, especially fragile states, are likely
to experience destruction of most of their long-term infrastructure investment and, most often,
prevent government from meeting her PPP contract obligations as well as ordinary citizens from
generating income to continue purchasing outputs of these investments. Therefore, we investigate
the potential role of higher population and real GDP per capita on the likelihood of PPP project
failure. Hence, we examine whether there is evidence to support the hypothesis that, ceteris
paribus, the more politically stable a country is, the lower the likelihood of PPP project failure.
We note that although duration analysis has been applied across many disciplines, including
medicine (see Kumar (2015)), labour economics and international relations (see Martinez-Garcia
and Raya (2008)), its application in project finance, particularly PPPs, is limited. We apply
duration analyses methods to data extracted from the World Bank’s PPI database.
As in other areas of economics, endogeneity due to selection bias or reverse causality pose
a problem for our analysis. For example, it is likely that unobservable variables that affect
residual value (and ownership assignment) also affect the probability of project failure. Our
analysis takes into account several covariates that may alleviate the endogeneity problem to some
extent. However, we do not claim to have established irrefutable causal relationship between
residual ownership assignment and project survival. However, our analyses demonstrate robust
associations that governments will do well to consider when negotiating terms, particularly for
PPP infrastructure projects.
3 Data and Methods
In line with our main aim of investigating whether PPP projects that confer residual facilities
ownership on the public sector have lower risk of experiencing failure or rather, greater chances of
survival, than those for which the private sector retains ownership, we test ‘whether’ and ‘when’
an event of PPP project failure occurs by employing the duration Analysis approach. We first
describe our data and then explain the application of the duration analysis.
Aiming to address our main question on the association between the Risk of PPP failure
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and Residual Ownership, we analyse data compiled from the World Bank’s Private Participation
Infrastructure (PPI) database, which is appropriate as it corrects right censoring.9 The dataset
for the year ending 2015, has longitudinal data for projects that have private sector participation
from 1980 to 2014 for low, lower-middle and upper-middle income countries across six regions:
East Asia and Pacific (EAP), Europe and Central Asia (ECA), Latin America and the Caribbean
(LAC), Middle East and North Africa (MENA), South Asia (SA) and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA.
Though the entire PPI dataset for 2015 consists of a total of 6530 projects, implemented across
139 countries, for our purposes our final sample consists of a total of 2721 projects, implemented
across 114 countries.10
Table 1: Regional Distribution of Projects
Total Number of Total Leading Country in Region
Region Countries Projects Investment % Country Project Investment
EAP 14 1041 217,662.8 24.6% China 750 70,813.7
ECA 19 162 83,322.2 9.4% Turkey 68 55,926.4
LAC 23 896 267,562.9 30.2% Brazil 435 138,924.0
MENA 11 88 67,159.2 7.6% Egypt, Arab Rep. 15 17,253.0
SA 8 345 170,480.2 19.3% India 237 130,687.3
SSA 39 189 79,076.4 8.9% Nigeria 16 28,007.7
Total 114 2721 885,263.6 100.0% 1521 441,612.1
Note: Investment is in millions of US$
Table 1 provides a summary of the regional distribution and total investment amount of the
selected sub-types of PPI projects. The table shows that the EAP region has the highest number
of projects, but the LAC region accounts for the greatest investment. However, in terms of
the average investment per country in a region ((Total Investment in the Region)/(Number of
Countries in Region)), SA (US$21.3 billion) has the highest, followed by EAP (US$15.5 billion).
The MENA region has the lowest number of projects, but its per country investment (US$6.1
billion) is greater than both ECA (US$4.4 billion) and SSA (US$2.0 billion). By far, China has
the largest number of projects in its region and amongst the countries under consideration, while
Brazil accounts for the greatest investment amount. Nigeria and Egypt have the highest PPI
investment in their respective regions.
In terms of sectoral distribution, the Energy sector accounts for most of the projects, totalling
1326 projects across all the regions, followed by the Transport sector (664), while the Water &
Sewerage, and Telecom sectors account for 17 and 10% respectively (see Figure 1).
The status field of the PPI dataset indicates whether the project is concluded, cancelled,
merged, operational, distressed or under construction (see Appendix IB). Figure 2 shows that the
majority of projects in all the regions are either operational or under construction. The LAC
region has the highest number of both cancelled (68) and concluded (72) projects, while MENA
has the lowest number and with no project in distress. According to the adopted definition of
project failure in this study, which includes cancelled, merged and distressed projects, ECA region
has the highest percentage of failed projects (20%), followed by SSA (15%), as shown in the line
graph in Figure 2.11
A total of 375 projects have the participation of multilateral institutions, such as the World
Bank and its affiliate organisations, the Asian Development Bank, the African Development Bank
9Censoring occurs whenever it is impossible to determine the exact time when a subject experiences the event
of interest, which in this case is when a PPP project failure occurs. Both Cox and Oakes (1984) highlights the
potential estimation bias of parameters when using data with right-censoring.
10We exclude (i) countries that do not have comprehensive macroeconomic, fiscal or political data e.g. Cuba,
Eritrea and Democratic Republic of Korea (ii) all projects with no reported investment amount.
11Merged projects are included as ‘failed’, because the project, on the basis of the original contract, did not go
to term and has had to be amended.
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Figure 1: Sectoral Distribution of Projects
Figure 2: Project Status
etc., in the PPI arrangements, while 918 projects have the participation of local sponsors.
Our final data sample considers four out of the 12 possible sub-types of PPI projects, two
(BOT and BOO) of which are regarded as typical PPP greenfield projects and thus, form the
crux of our research. In addition to BOT (build, operate & transfer, where the residual facility
of the project is transferred to the public sector after the expiry of an agreed concession period)
and BOO (build, operate & own, where the private sector retains residual facility ownership), we
consider ROT and Mct sub-types for robustness checks. There are a total of 1370 and 629 BOT
and BOO projects respectively in the sample, with the EAP region accounting for most of these
projects followed by the LAC region (see Table 2).
3.1 PPP failure definition
In this study, the event of interest is ‘project failure’, which is defined as a deviation of a PPP
project outcome from the original conceptualisation by the partners. This definition conforms with
the definition typically used in the extant literature, and aligns with the aims of our study. In
10
         
Table 2: Regional Distribution of PPI Sub-types
Types of PPI EAP ECA LAC MENA SA SSA Total
Build, Operate, and Transfer (BOT) 680 45 424 44 138 39 1370
Build, Own, and Operate (BOO) 120 42 259 15 135 58 629
Merchant (Mct) 21 47 28 22 44 68 230
Rehabilitate, Operate and Transfer (ROT) 220 28 185 7 28 24 492
Total 1041 162 896 88 345 189 2721
Note: East Asia and Pacific (EAP), Europe and Central Asia (ECA), Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC).
Middle East and North Africa (MENA), South Asia (SA) and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).
other words, any form of hiccup encountered by the project after financial closure, which changes
the original agreement or structure and/or brings the project to an untimely end, is considered as
an event of failure. Accordingly, a project is said to have experienced the event of failure if either
of the following states apply:
1. It is in distress : According to the World Bank, this means that the government or the spon-
sor (the private partner) has either requested contract termination or are in international
arbitration, thus paving the way for an untimely end of the project;
2. It is merged with another during operations: This is when there are changes the structure
of the original project; and
3. It is cancelled : This leads to an abrupt end of the project.
Given that our analyses involves censored data, and Cox and Oakes (1984) and Hosmer and
Lemeshow (1999) both expand on the advantages of duration analysis over the other techniques
when dealing with censored event history data, we employ that approach in this study. The
type of censoring we deal with in this study is right-censored, which is the most common form
of censoring i.e. when the study comes to an end without the subject experiencing the event of
interest, or when the subject drops out during the study period because something other than the
event of interest occurred.12 Thus, each project has a potential censoring time Ci or a potential
lifetime Ti, which makes the observation, Yi = min(Ti, Ci). This implies that survival time of a
project is considered to be at least as long as the duration of the study period. The censoring




0 if Ti > Ci (censored)
1 if Ti ≤ Ci (event of failure)
In line with recommendations in previous literature (see examples Broström, (2012), Jenkins,
(2005), and Singer and Willett, (2003)), the censored projects were not discarded from the final
dataset because doing so would introduce bias in the analysis as most of the information about
PPP projects longevity would have been lost in the process, noting that a large number of PPP
projects survived for a long period of time before being censored.
3.2 Time considerations
To determine the appropriate model for carrying out our analyses, we ascertain whether time
should be treated as continuous or discrete. Since the World Bank’s PPI database does not contain
a field that explicitly shows year of project failure, we determine the event year information
from the (i) The Contract Period, which is sometimes referred to as the concession period i.e.
12See Appendix I for additional detail.
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the expected implementation period of the project. (ii) The Termination Year, which is the
anticipated end year of the project as stated in the agreement signed between the partners. (iii)
The Investment Year, which is otherwise known as the disbursement year, and is the period
over which funds are released into the project. Funds can be released in annual granularity up to
several years. (iv) Date status updated i.e. the date when the World Bank’s PPI team updates the
status of the project and (v) Project Status, which indicates whether the project is, for example,
cancelled or concluded.
For precision, we do not simply take the termination year to be the event year since it is
possible that a project will not survive up to its anticipated end date, nor do we take the date
status updated without due care for other factors because on that date the project status might
indicate that the project is ‘operational’, meaning that it did not experience the event of failure
as at the end of the study period.
3.3 Variables description
All variables are defined for each project i and for each year j until the project experiences the
event of failure or is censored. Table 3 presents a summary of the description of the variables and
a priori expected signs.






Project Failure Failedij Equal to 1 if the project i failed at time j
and 0 if the project does not fail
Independent Variables
(1) Variables on project characteristics
PPP Sub-type
BOO Build Operate and Transfer Positive Relative to BOT
BOT Build Own and Operate Negative Relative to BOO
BOT*Spell Interaction between PPP Sub-type
and operation period (in years )
Project Size
Size medium Medium size project Negative Relative to Large Size
Size small Small size project Negative Relative to Large Size
Participation of Multilateral Institutions (Yes=1)
Mult Part(0) No multilateral participation Positive Relative to Mult Part (1)
Local Sponsor Participation (Yes=1)




W & S Water and Sewerage
Region
ECA Europe and Central Asia
LAC Latin America and the Caribbean
MENA Middle East and North Africa
SA South Asia
SSA Sub-Saharan Africa
(2) Variables on country characteristics
Market Variables
LPopn log of population Negative In the model all of
LGDPPC log of GDP per Capita Negative these variables have the
Fiscal Constraint Variables prefix C and some KC.
LDSerExP log of debt service to Positive The C means that the
export of good and services variable is centered
LDstockGDP log of debt stock to GDP from its mean and the
LRev GDP log of government revenue to GDP Negative KC means the variable
Macroeconomic Constraint is both centered and
infl inflation Positive categorised, which helps to
LEXRate log of exchange rate Positive determine whether the
Political Constraint effect of the variable
PV.EST Political stability and Negative is non-linear
absence of violence
As is the case with survival models, our response variable consists of two parts: the first part
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gives a binary outcome - indicating whether or not the event of failure occurs; while the second
part shows the time in years until project failure or censoring. Our main explanatory variable,
PPP Sub-types, is a dichotomous variable with 1 representing a BOO project and 0 for a BOT
project. The data for this variable is a subset of the data in the ‘PPI-Subtype’ field of the World
Bank’s PPI dataset.13
3.4 Survival and hazard functions
Using the hazard function (h(tij)) as the function that gives the instantaneous potential in each
year in operation for a PPP project i to experience the event (failure), given that it has survived
up to year j, the estimated discrete-time hazard function for year in operation j is calculated as:
ĥ(tij)= [No. of failed projects in year in operation (j )] / [No. of projects at risk of failure in year
in operation (j )]
Table 4, a Life Table for the PPP data summarises the sample distribution for event occurrence.
Columns 2 and 3 report the number of projects at risk of experiencing failure during a given year
of operation and the projects that failed in each year of operation respectively. The Hazard and
Survival rates are reported in Columns 5 and 6 respectively.
Figure 3: Estimated year by year hazard rate as reported in Table 4
The survival function (S(tij)) assesses the probability that project i will experience failure
after surviving up to year j, and is formally written as 14:
S(tij) = Pr[Ti > j] (2)
The estimated discrete-time survival function is written in terms of the hazard function as:
Ŝ(tij) = [1 − ĥ(1)] × [1 − ĥ(2)] × · · · × [1 − ĥ(j − 1)] (3)
= Ŝ(j − 1) × [1 − ĥ(j − 1)] (4)
13See Appendix II for a fuller description of these variables.
14In other words, the survival function cumulates the period-by-period risks of project failure.
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Table 4: Life Table for PPP Projects
Number of
Years in Projects Failed Censored Hazard Survival
Operation at Risk Projects Projects Rate Rate
0 2721 9 87 0.003 0.997
1 2625 16 125 0.006 0.991
2 2484 17 152 0.007 0.984
3 2315 33 157 0.014 0.970
4 2125 48 107 0.023 0.948
5 1970 16 114 0.008 0.940
6 1840 21 148 0.011 0.929
7 1671 12 179 0.007 0.923
8 1480 13 162 0.009 0.915
9 1305 19 168 0.015 0.901
10 1118 9 116 0.008 0.894
11 993 6 138 0.006 0.889
12 849 4 124 0.005 0.885
13 721 2 103 0.003 0.882
14 616 10 126 0.016 0.868
15 480 4 51 0.008 0.861
16 425 4 72 0.009 0.852
17 349 1 104 0.003 0.850
18 244 1 75 0.004 0.847
19 168 4 60 0.024 0.826
20 104 0 41 0.000 0.826
21 63 1 23 0.016 0.813
22 39 1 9 0.026 0.792
23 29 0 3 0.000 0.792
24 26 1 11 0.038 0.762
25 14 0 10 0.000 0.762
26 4 0 2 0.000 0.762
27 2 1 1 0.500 0.381
Note: This table cumulates all projects from 1986 to 2014 and then groups
them according to the number of years for which they survived before
experiencing the event of failure or are censored. For example, out of
the 2721 projects in the dataset, 9 experienced the event of failure while 87
were censored within 1 year of operation. The table does not report
the year when the event of failure or censoring occurred.
The graphical illustration of the estimated hazard function (see Figure 3) suggests a cyclical
behaviour of the hazard rate of PPP failure, with a jump in the risk of PPP project failure at
fairly regular intervals. This appears to coincide with political election cycles, which are run
typically every 5 years; and the risk of project failure may be impacted by the PPP stance taken
by the incoming party.15
Aiming to determine whether BOT projects have lower risk of failure than BOO projects,
we fit an appropriate statistical model of hazard to the variable representing the types of PPP
projects along with all identified control variables.
15The potential link between political election cycles and PPP project failures, as suggested here, is an area for
future research.
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3.5 Kaplan-Meier non-parametric survival approach
In the literature of survival analysis, there are two main types of non-parametric estimators of the
hazard and survival functions: the Kaplan-Meier (KM) and the Life-table estimators. Here, we
focus on the KM estimator, as it incorporates information from all observations, whether censored
or uncensored (Bosco Sabuhoro et al., 2006). The KM survival function for PPP projects is given
by the product of one minus the number of projects that experienced the event of failure in year
j of operation, dj, divided by the number of projects at risk of experiencing failure in that same
year, nj (i.e. the number of projects at risk of ending their spell immediately prior to time tj).












is the ratio of the number of failed projects to the number of projects at risk of experi-
encing the event failure.16
Figure 4: Hazard Functions for BOT and BOO Projects



























































First, from Figure 4, we infer that BOO projects appear to be riskier than BOT projects, as
they have higher odds of experiencing the event of failure. It also suggests that the risk of failure
for BOO projects is elevated after every five years, while for BOT projects, the risk gradually
dissipates after the first five years of operation. On the whole however, the hazard functions for
both BOT and BOO projects appear to have multiple distinctive peaks and troughs, which may
indicate non-monotonicity. Second, from Figure 5, we infer that the survival functions for the
two types of PPP projects clearly suggests that BOT projects have higher chances of survival
compared to BOO projects.
16This ratio is also referred to as the hazard rate.
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Figure 5: Survival Functions for BOT and BOO Projects






























3.6 Discrete time hazard approach
Next, we employ the discrete-time hazard modelling approach proposed by Cox (1972a), where the
discrete-time hazard (a conditional probability) is transformed into its odds or log odds thereby
preserving its lower and upper bounds of 0 and 1 respectively. Following from this and the
recommendations of Singer and Willet (2003), we employ a logit transformed model for this study
which tends to maintain a proportional distance between the BOT and BOO hazard curves, while




αjDij + (ϕ1Z1i + ϕ2Z2i + · · · + ϕmZmi)
+ (β1X1ij + β2X2ij + · · · + βpXpij)
(6)
where the first term on the right hand side, the αs multiplied by their respective time indicator
(time dummies) D, act as multiple intercepts, one per period, which as a group represents the
baseline logit hazard function, i.e., the value of the logit hazard when all substantive predictors
are zero. The ϕs and βs multiplied by their respective substantive predictors, represent the shift
in the baseline logit hazard function corresponding to unit differences in the associated predictors
while holding the other predictors constant. Z1i represents the time-invariant covariates, while
X1ij represents time varying covariates.




αjDj + ϕ1PPI Subtypei + ϕ2Sizei + ϕ3L Spon Parti
+ ϕ4Mult Parti + ϕ5Regioni + ϕ6Prim Seci + β1DstockGDPij
+ β2DSerExpij + β3GDPPCij + β4Inflij + β5ExRateij
+ β6Popnij + β7Rev GDPij + β8PSAVij
(7)
16
         
The model stipulates that project i ’s value of logit hazard in period j depends on the value of
all time-invariant covariates (e.g., size of the project), which remain constant across time, and all
the values of the time-varying covariates (e.g., inflation) in time period j. All the time-varying
covariates in this model are communal, which means that they take different values in each time
period. Time-varying covariates can take the following forms: (i) Factor - e.g., civil, status, which
indicates whether someone is married or not. This status may change over time. (ii) Continuous
covariates - this is a time-dependent variable that changes over time but these changes are known
exactly, e.g., age, election cycle, etc. This type of time-varying covariate has the danger of reversed
causality as explained by Singer and Willett (2003, p. 436). (iii) Communal (external) covariates
- these are time-varying covariates that vary over time and are not within the subject’s control
i.e., exogenous. It is a special case of a time-varying covariate, but without the danger of reversed
causality (see Broström, 2012: p. 68).
Next, inclusion of time as a categorical variable with a category for each year of operation
yields a step-function. However, using 29 time dummies in even the presence of large project-year
dataset may make the model perform poorly, and result in a baseline hazard function that may
fluctuate erratically in the later periods; and inestimable in the early periods, when no project is
reported as failed (see Singer and Willett, 2003). Following recommendations by Allison (1982)
and Singer and Willett (2003), we explore other specifications including linear, quadratic, pth-
order quadratic and log specifications.
Table 5: Representation of Time
Difference in deviance
in comparison to ...
Representation Number Previous General
of TIME Parameter Deviance Model Model AIC
constant 1 2716.1 377.2 2718.1
linear 2 2404.0 312.1 65.1 2408.0
quadratic 3 2396.9 7.1 58.0 2402.9
cubic 4 2393.8 3.1 54.9 2401.8
fourth order 5 2393.0 0.8 54.1 2403.0
log 2 2428.4 -35.4 89.5 2432.4
General 29 2338.9 – – 2394.9
5% Critical Value = 3.84
Table 5 presents a comparison of the deviance and Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) statis-
tics for various time specifications. Considering both the AIC and the difference in deviance
criteria, this study adopts the quadratic specification, which has one less parameter and yet is
not significantly different from the cubic specification, to fit the final empirical model, which is
given as:
logit[h(ti)] = ONE + (Spell − 5) + (Spell − 5)2 + ϕ1PPI Subtypei + ϕ2Sizei
+ ϕ3L Spon Parti + ϕ4Mult Parti + ϕ5Regioni + ϕ6Prim Seci
+ β1DstockGDPij + β2DSerExpij + β3GDPPCij + β4Inflij
+ β5ExRateij + β6Popnij + β7Rev GDPij + β8PSAVij
(8)
where ONE and Spell is a matrix of ones, included to capture the constant term, and Spell
represents each year of project survival.17
For the Discrete-time model analyses, we employ five logit-link models:
175 is specifically used to center time (Spell) because the hazards of the BOO and BOT projects have their first
peak during the fifth year of project operations and while the hazard for BOO projects elevates approximately
every five years thereafter, the hazard of BOT projects gradually dissipates.
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Model 1: Only one explanatory variable i.e. PPP Sub-type. Aims to investigate the rela-
tionship between residual facilities ownership (PPP Sub-type) and the risk of PPP project failure
without consideration for potential endogeneity.
Model 2: Model 1 plus additional explanatory variables that relate to the characteristics of
PPP projects, including the project size, the participation of multilateral institution and local
sponsors in the project arrangement as well as the regional and sectoral placement of the project.
Model 3: Model 2 plus variables that relate to the characteristics of the country where the
project is implemented, including fiscal, macroeconomic and market as well as political variables.
Effectively, this model checks for potential confounding factors arising from both project and
country characteristics.
Model 4: Model 3 with the incorporation of an interaction term between residual ownership
(PPP Sub-type) and time (Spell-5), thus allowing for the difference between BOT and BOO
projects to differ in each year of project operations. The aim here is to investigate whether or
not the hazards of PPP Sub-type are non-proportional over time, that is testing whether the
proportionality assumption holds.
Model 5: Similar to Model 4, except that the communal variables (these are the variables
that relate to the characteristics of the country where the project is implemented) are stratified
in an attempt to investigate the possibility for non-linearity between them and the risk of PPP
project failure (see Singer and Willett, 2003).
Although Cox (1972b) proposes a partial likelihood method similar to that for continuous-time
data, it is also known to be computationally demanding when several projects are experiencing
the event of failure at the same time, and is therefore unattractive. The proposed alternative
is to use the more conventional method of maximum likelihood (ML), which seeks to estimate
population parameters (which in the case of this study are αs, ϕs and βs) that maximise the
likelihood of observing the sample data.18 Tables 7-9 in the Appendix IIB report the full results,
including Model 5, our preferred model.
In addition to the above, for robustness checking, we first employ a matching strategy to match
BOT to BOO projects in order to ascertain causal inference of residual facility ownership on the
risk of failure of PPP projects. Second, two additional PPI sub-types were included in the model
to verify whether indeed projects that confer residual ownership to the public sector have lower
risk of failure. These results are reported in the Appendix IIC.
4 Empirical Results and Discussion
4.1 Results
4.1.1 Kaplan-Meier Non-parametric Survival Model results
Starting with the main explanatory variable, PPP Sub-type, Figure 5 illustrates that PPP projects
which are structured as BOT, that is, projects that confer residual facilities ownership on the
public sector at the expiry of the contract, have higher chances of survival than BOO projects,
under which residual ownership is assigned to the private sector.
Table 6 shows that, on average, BOT projects survive approximately five years longer than
BOO projects (using the Restricted Mean (R-mean)). The Mantel-Haenszel and the Peto & Peto
tests were used to check for the significance of the difference between the two groups. In essence,
these tests check whether it is necessary to differentiate between the two PPP sub-types.19 Both
tests show a highly significant difference between BOT and BOO projects in terms of their survival
18We follow the ML procedure outlined by Singer and Willett (2003, pp. 381-384).
19The null hypothesis of the tests is that there are no within-groups differences. These tests are chi-square tests
with degree of freedom equal to the number of within-groups minus 1. For example, the degree of freedom for
PPP Sub-type is 1 and that of Size is 2.
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Table 6: Logrank Test of Significance for Difference in Within-groups Variables
R-mean
Mantel-Haenszel test (Rho = 0) †Peto & Peto (Rho = 1)
Chisq P-value Chisq P-value
PPP Sub-types 114 0.000*** 110 0.000***
BOO 21.1
BOT 26.4




Multilateral Participation 0.3 0.578 0.3 0.566
No 24.6
Yes 24.9




Water & Sewerage 24.8
Local Sponsor Participation 18.1 2.05e-05*** 18.1 2.14e-05 ***
No 23.1
Yes 25.4







†Peto & Peto modification of the Gehan-Wilcoxon test
rate. We also find that small size projects have higher probabilities of survival than both medium
and large size projects, and in turn, medium size projects have higher probabilities of survival than
large size projects. These differences in survival probabilities of the various sizes are also indicated
to be significant as shown in Table 6. On average, small size projects can survive approximately a
year and a half longer than medium size projects and three years longer than large size projects.
Second, we find that participation of local sponsors in PPP arrangements increases the prob-
ability of survival of the project, while Table 6 indicates that projects with local sponsor par-
ticipation survive, on average, by an extra two years when compared to projects without local
sponsors’, participation, a difference that was also found to be significant.
Third, the survival functions for multilateral institutions’ participation in PPP arrangements
indicate that there is no difference between a project that has the participation of multilateral
institutions and one that does not. To buttress this point, Table 6 shows that multilateral par-
ticipation in PPP project arrangement only increases the survival of the project, on average, by
about 4 months and both the Mantel-Haenszel and Peto and Peto tests suggest this difference is
not significant.
Fourth, in terms of regional grouping (see Figure 6 in Supplementary Appendix), we find that
for the first 10 years of operation, the survival of PPP projects is very similar across all the regions.
However, beyond this period, project survival becomes very different with ECA registering the
lowest survival rates, followed by SSA, while SA and LAC remain almost indistinguishable and
so are EAP and MENA until 20 years of operation.
Table 6 further confirms the graphical output and indicates that there is a significant difference
in project survival in the various regions with ECA on one extreme, registering, on average, 16.6
years of survival and EAP on the other extreme, 24.2 years.
Finally, for sectoral grouping (see Figure 7 in Supplementary Appendix), we find that while
the survival rates are similar for the Energy, Transport and Water & Sewerage sectors (restricted
mean year of survival of around 25 years), the rate for Telecom is significantly lower with a
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restricted mean year of survival of 18.8 years.
4.1.2 Discrete-time Hazard Models Results
To evaluate whether there is an improvement from one model fit to another, we make a comparison
between the difference in the deviation of two successive models to a 5% critical value of a chi -
square distribution with degree of freedom equal to the difference in the number of parameters
between the two models. The AIC statistic are also considered to aid the selection.
Based on the above procedure, our results suggest Model 2, (with AIC and deviation values
of 2141.9 and of 2109.9 respectively) appears to be better than Model 1 (with AIC and deviation
values of 2343.8 and 2335.8 respectively). The superiority of Model 2 is confirmed by the highly
significant chi-square test value (225.9∗∗∗). Next, we find Model 3 to be better than Model
2, thus indicating that in addition to project characteristics, there are country characteristics
that confound the relationship between residual facilities ownership and the risk of PPP project
failure in the model. Model 4 provides sufficient evidence for the violation of the proportionality
assumption made in Model 3. Finally, Model 5 confirms that in addition to the violation of
the proportionality assumption, the relationship between the communal variables and the risk of
PPP project failure is non-linear. As a result, our study settles for Model 5 to interpret the
relationship between residual facilities ownership and risk of PPP project failure.
Our results indicate that there is a highly significant difference in the risk of failure between
small and large size projects. The odds of small size projects experiencing the event of failure are
about 36% of that of large size projects, while the odds of medium size projects are about 72%
of that of large size projects. Both local sponsors and multilateral institutions’ participation in
PPP project arrangements were found to be insignificant in explaining the risk of project failure,
albeit the negative signs of their respective coefficients are consistent with a priori expectations,
indicating that their participation reduces the risk of experiencing the event of failure. Sectoral
heterogeneity is found to be highly significant in explaining the risk of PPP project failure.
The odds of experiencing project failure in the Telecom sector are about 6 times that of the
Energy sector, while the odds of the other two sectors (Water & Sewerage, and Transport) are
approximately three times that of the Energy sector. The implication is that projects implemented
in the Telecom sector are comparatively more susceptible to failure. Across the different regions,
only the MENA region exhibits significant difference with the benchmark region, EAP. The odds
of PPP project failure in the MENA region is about 23% that of the EAP region. The effect of
the market constraint variables, Population and GDP per capita, on the risk of project failure
appears to be non-linear, albeit insignificant.20 In terms of the macroeconomic variables, countries
with high inflation rates have significantly high risk of project failure, so are countries with
high exchange rates. Two out of the three fiscal constraints variables considered in this study,
debt service to exports and government revenue to GDP are significant in explaining the risk of
PPP project failure. Consistent with a priori expectations, high revenue to GDP ratios have
a decreasing effect on the risk of project failure. Also, the coefficient of the Political constraint
variable, PV.EST, has the right sign consistent with its a priori expectation, albeit not statistically
significant in explaining the risk of project failure.
4.2 Discussion
Hart (2003) posits that granting of residual rights to a particular party in an agreement motivates
that party to increase her ex-ante investment in the relationship. This could be the case when
20The linearity assumption is determined in this case by examining the pattern of parameters (and accompanying
standard errors) for the system of dummies. With equally spaced predictors categories, a linear effect will lead to
successive estimates being ’equi-distant’ (see Singer and Willett, 2003), which is not this case here, thus suggesting
non-linearity.
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residual facilities ownership is conferred on the public sector, which could incentivise the sector
to provide more support in order to ensure the success of the project, particularly if the project
has positive residual value that is of the nature of a public good and will potentially enhance the
development process in line with the ‘big-push’ theory. The motivation for optimal public sector
ex-ante investment could also come from the fact that governments that successfully implement
infrastructure projects for which they retain ownership are able to use the achievement to gain
political advantage.
Given the possibility that the PPP project will end up with net negative residual value and
parties cannot absolutely determine this ex-ante, the party upon whom residual ownership is
conferred may acquire an asset or a liability. With the assumption that the private sector is moti-
vated by profit, if allocated the residual facilities, any anticipated risk associated with the facility
would be costed and incorporated into the project output tariff. This might not necessarily be
the case if the public sector assumes the risk of residual facilities ownership (the RVR). Therefore,
this reality may explain why private sector ownership of the residual facilities tends to lead to
increased project costs and hence output affordability, which could lead to premature termination
of the project. The public sector, assumed not to be motivated by profit, but rather citizens’
welfare and economic development, even if for self-centered or political reasons, has the tendency
of absorbing some of these costs. Hence, when residual ownership is given to the public sector,
there is a higher likelihood that the cost of decommissioning a project would not be borne directly
by the end-users, thereby making the project affordable, which may enhance pro-poor growth.
Our results highlight the importance of project size vis-à-vis the risk of project failure. Small
size projects appear to have lower risk of failure, followed by medium size projects.21 This outcome
buttresses the point made about project affordability to the end-users and/or the fiscus. Large
size projects normally result in higher output tariffs, which could prove unaffordable and have the
tendency in the medium to long-term to restrict public policy choices or final consumer demand
for cheaper alternatives in the presence of technological advancement.
Although participation of multilateral institutions and local sponsors have only been recently
gaining momentum, the role on the reduction of risk of failure of PPP projects is yet to be
realised. However, our results highlight a significant issue for economic development i.e., sectoral
heterogeneity in risk of PPP project failure. The following sectors rank highly in developing
countries’ developmental objectives. Projects implemented in the Energy sector (which are mostly
structured as BOT) exhibit the lowest risk of failure, followed by the Transport sector. Projects
in the Telecom sector (which are mostly structured as BOO) have the highest risk of failure.
It is worth highlighting that the Telecom sector is characterised by merging and sale of assets
as operators try to gain greater competitive edge or profitability.22 As noted by Chan-Olmsted
and Jamison (2001, p.2), since the passage of the Telecommunications Act in 1996, the US has
witnessed multiple mergers of leading telecommunications companies, including between TCI,
Media One and AT&T and MCI Worldcom and Sprint, all in an attempt to gain “competitive
advantages through strategic combinations of resources and presence in multiple product and
geographical markets”. This is also evident in developing countries e.g. AirTel and Africell in
Sierra Leone.
Further, from the regional perspective, our results suggest that PPP projects implemented in
the MENA region have the lowest risk of experiencing event of failure. We find that the highest
risk of project failure is in the EAP region, followed by the LAC region. This could be attributed to
their early engagement in PPPs, at a time when the framework was less understood and mistakes
abounded. On the other hand, projects implemented in the MENA and SSA regions showed
relatively lower risk of failure, as these regions started implementing PPP projects much later
and therefore, had the opportunity to learn from the mistakes of early implementers. However,
21Recall, size is measured as a ratio of the total investment in a project to the GDP of the country where the
project is implemented.
22It should be recalled that the definition of failure in this research includes merged projects.
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we note that, for the early adopters (EAP and LAC regions), since the results are based on
averages, the failures in earlier years could bias recent achievements made by these regions, which
are now considered as the leading regions in the implementation of PPPs. Developing countries
engaging in PPPs for development will need to a priori learn from other countries’ experiences.
We highlight that our results indicate that variables representing governments’ ability to meet
their obligation under PPP arrangements are highly significant. Public debt service to GDP ratio,
a measure of government’s inability to quickly raise debt, especially from non-residents to meet
liquidity shortfalls, is statistically significant and demonstrates a positive relationship with the
risk of project failure. This means that a country that finds it difficult to raise debt to meet
emergency liquidity problems are at greater risk of experiencing PPP project failure. Developing
countries engaging in PPPs for development will need to a priori have sustainable debt levels,
plus a good record of reserves.
We find the macroeconomic variables (Inflation and Exchange rate) to be statistically signif-
icant, thus impacting project affordability. Countries with high inflation and exchange rates are
more vulnerable to experiencing PPP project failure, as increases in these indicators directly lead
to higher output (local) prices, thereby becoming unaffordable for end-users, particularly the poor
and hence, serving as a catalyst for project failure. Developing countries engaging in PPPs for
development will need to a priori stabilize these macroeconomic indicators.
Our finding that political instability was not a significant factor in explaining PPP project
failure is worth highlighting. We note that several PPP arrangements, especially those with
the involvement of multilateral institutions, incorporate mechanisms to insure against temporal
political instabilities, hence it becomes less of a concern. For example, the Multilateral Investment
Guarantee Agency of the World Bank includes in PPPs arrangements political risk insurance and
credit enhancement guarantees aiming to facilitate project success, particularly in developing and
emerging countries.23
Finally, based on our analyses of the discrete-time hazard function, it appears that the risk
of PPP project failure spikes after every five years of project operation, and more so for BOO
projects, which is also consistent with the political cycle of most of the countries in the study.
Further, the MENA region, where until recently most of the countries, including Egypt, Libya,
Morocco and Jordan, have unlimited political term limits, has the lowest risk of project failure.
This may suggest that a more stable and predictable political system with uninterrupted PPP
government policies appears to reduce the risk of project failure.24
Overall, our results provide evidence supporting the hypothesis that PPP projects that are
structured to confer residual facility ownership on the public partner have lower risk of experi-
encing failure or rather, have a higher survival rate, than those that confer such ownership on
the private partner. We infer that public partner residual ownership helps to make PPP projects
affordable. The public partner is assumed to be motivated purely by citizens’ welfare and not
profit and therefore, likely to absorb some of the costs including residual value risk, rather than
transferring such costs to the end-users. Intuitively, such support from the public partner is cru-
cial for project affordability and hence, longevity. In cases where such support is not provided
e.g., the Paiton project in Indonesia and the Dabhol project in India, project affordability did
become a challenge, and led to project failure (see Davis, 1996).
Second, and as elucidated by Hart (2003), granting of residual ownership to the public partner
could motivate them to increase government’s ex-ante investment in the relationship, particularly
if the project has positive residual value i.e., project is of the nature of a public good. Further,
motivation for optimal public partner ex-ante investment could also come if the public partner
intends to showcase the project’s success to gain political capital. It is commonplace for incum-
bent political parties to make claims that most of the existing infrastructure in their country were
23See Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency of the World Bank website. at
https://www.miga.org/Pages/Who%20We%20Are/Overview.aspx
24We note, however, that we cannot draw conclusive inferences on this from our analyses on this particular issue.
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developed during their tenure in power under various partnership arrangements e.g., several polit-
ical commentators view Sierra Leone’s August 2007 presidential elections to have been won based
on such campaign claims by the then incumbent. On the more positive side, following the election
win, the party embarked on elaborate infrastructure programs (especially roads), mostly through
PPPs, to consolidate its political gains. To buttress this point, more recently, both Ghana’s
2012 and 2016 presidential elections’ main campaign promises of the respective incumbents i.e.,
‘Advancing a Better Ghana’ and ‘One District One Factory’, bear testament to this fact.
5 Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
The central issue this study addresses is how residual ownership of PPP projects affects infrastruc-
ture project survival. We posit that how governments negotiate this should not be underestimated,
particularly for developing and emerging economies. Given the well-documented importance of
infrastructure for economic growth and development, many in the development and policy com-
munity, including international institutions like the World Bank, have called for a ‘big push’ in
infrastructure investments in developing countries for economic development. Based on the extant
literature, this study developed several hypotheses relating the role of residual ownership in the
survival of infrastructure projects. The main tenet of the hypotheses being that since there is
Residual Value Risk associated with the ownership of the residual facility in long-term relation-
ships like PPPs, such ownership should be bestowed upon the partner that is less likely to translate
the costing of this risk into the overall project cost, thereby enhancing project affordability, even
for the poor, and hence longevity.
Analysing a sample of 2721 PPP projects across four major sectors (Energy, Telecom, Trans-
port and Water & Sewerage) from 114 developing and emerging countries in six regions (EAP,
ECA, LAC, MENA, SA and SSA), we conclude the following: First, governments should know
that factors crucial for the survival of the project include project size, since large-sized projects
appear to be more susceptible to failure than small-sized projects. Thus, governments, tasked with
policy and decision-making should resist the temptation to undertake unsustainably large-sized
PPP projects. Second, Energy sector projects appear to have lower risk of failure than Telecom
sector projects. Energy projects, which are fundamental for economic development appears an
attractive PPP route developing economies may want to consider. Third, it is incumbent on
governments to learn from other countries’ experiences. The MENA region, for example, had the
lowest risk of PPP project failure compared to EAP and LAC. We infer that unhindered public
sector support and learning from the lessons of earlier implementers could actually reduce the
risk of project failure for developing economies. Fourth, risk of project failure is mitigated when
governments have strong ability to generate revenue or raise debt within the shortest possible
period to meet contingent fiscal obligations. Particularly those arising from the crystallization of
contingencies under PPPs. Developing countries should aim to maintain sustainable debt levels
and credibility in the capital markets. Fifth, governments need to prioritise macroeconomic stabil-
ity since macroeconomic variables such as inflation and exchange rates affect PPP project output
tariff and hence, output affordability and can influence risk of PPP projects failure. High ex-
change and inflation rates increase the propensity of PPP project failure, thus further buttressing
the point that the cost of the project is very crucial for its survival.
Given both the direct and indirect implications of infrastructure investments for economic
growth and development, thorough consideration of PPP residual ownership risk is crucial, hence
some policy recommendations are instructive.
First, contrary to Bennett and Iossa (2006), we conclude that residual facility ownership should
be given ex-ante to the public sector partner, particularly for long-duration projects, while an
embedded option could be written in the project agreement granting the transfer of the facility
to the private sector partner based on mutually-agreed terms and conditions in the event that the
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residual facility ends up with positive residual value that is of the nature of a private good. Such
an arrangement could lead to a reduction in the output tariff as the government stands to bear
the RVR while, at the same time, presenting an incentive for the optimal investment of the private
sector partner(s). Second, goverments should give special attention to the selection of appropriate
project sizes, which in this study effectively relates to the level of project investment as percent
of GDP. In developing countries, particularly, projects too big relative to potential demand and
affordability by end-users and/or the government fiscus will have a higher likelihood of failure
because of its tendency to restrict public sector policy choices and end-users’ demand for cheaper
alternatives in the presence of technological advancement. Third, governments seeking to engage
in PPPs should ensure that they have the explicit support of the different arms of government as
well as the general public in order to avoid future reversal of project agreements that may affect
the welfare of the private sector partner in the event of ex-post renegotiations.
Intuitively, the huge infrastructure gap being faced globally (which is particularly in the Energy
and Transport sectors), works against the sustainable development aims of developing countries.
Governments have a huge role to play in this. We conclude that residual ownership risk of
PPP infrastructure projects is related to project failures, which impede countries’ development
efforts and to derive the long-term benefits of infrastructure investments to complement other
development efforts. Developing country governments, particularly, seeking to undertake PPPs
for development, need to give critical consideration to residual ownership risk to minimise projects
failures.
Although our analysis shows a positive impact of the assignment of residual ownership to
the government on the survival of infrastructure projects, it is essential to also recognise that
government officials may be motivated to assume residual ownership for personal gains. This is
consistent with the rich public choice literature. In line with Li and Maskin (2021), we recommend
that future research may consider evaluating the complex interactions between the motives and
behaviour of government officials and the private sector within the context of the assignment of
residual ownership.
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Appendix I
Censoring of the Data
The extant literature (see Jenkins, 2005) identified three main types of censoring, including:
1. Right censoring: this occurs when the study comes to an end without the subject experi-
encing the event of interest, or when the subject drops out during the study period because
something other than the event of interest occurred. Right censoring is regarded as the most
common form of censoring.
2. Left censoring: this occurs when the initial time at risk for the subject is unknown. That
is, the subject experienced the event prior to the commencement of the study.
3. Interval censoring: this is a combination of both right and left censoring. In this type of
censoring, it is known that the event of interest occurred between two time points, but the
exact time of occurrence of the event is unknown. For example, if a project is reported as
being operational at Period 1 of a panel study, but failed before Period 2, then the failure
time is interval censored as it happens between two time periods.
Appendix II
Appendix IIA:
For completeness, we employ two sets of control variables. Our first set depicts the specific
characteristics of PPP projects as contained in the PPI dataset, and includes: the project size
and the participation of multilateral institution(s) as well as local sponsor(s) in the project ar-
rangement. The second set of control variables depicts the characteristics of the country where
the project is implemented. The reason is based on their tendency to influence the ability of the
public sector and/or the end-users to meet their obligations under PPP arrangements or afford
the PPP project output, which may culminate in early project failure. Specifically, the variables
include Fiscal Control variables (Public Debt Burden and Government revenue as a percentage
of GDP); Macroeconomic and Market Control variables (the pricing group being inflation and
exchange rates, and the Output group being GDP per capita and Population). The data for
this set of variables were directly obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indica-
tors (WDI) and World Governance Indicators (WGI) databases. Political Control variable (the
political stability and the absence of violence (PSAV) reported by the World Bank
Project Size
The size of a project is considered to be an endogenous variable, which could make the es-
timated coefficient binding the relationship between residual facilities ownership and the risk of
PPP project failure to be likely biased and not directly interpretable (Nini, 2004). To mitigate this
problem of endogeneity, a dummy variable was created for project size through a 2-step process.
First, determining the total investment divided by the 4-year average GDP, then creating a 3-way
dummy for project size - small (<34th percentile), Medium (between 34th and 63rd percentile) and
Large (>63th percentile).
Participation of Multilateral Institutions
The aim here is to check whether or not there is the participation of multilateral institution(s)
in the PPP project arrangement. This means that the variable of interest is one of a binary
nature with 1 representing the presence of multilateral institution(s) and 0 otherwise. The field
‘Multilateral Support’ in the PPI dataset makes provision for this kind of assessment.
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Participation of Local Sponsors
Similar to multilateral institutions, local sponsors’ participation in PPPs is a dichotomous
variable with 1 representing the presence of a local sponsor and 0 otherwise. The PPI dataset
gives a field for Sponsors, which provides information on the name of the sponsors and countries
of domicile as well as the percentage equity contribution of the various sponsors. A project could
have foreign or local or both foreign and local sponsors. In this study, a local sponsor refers to
non-parastatal that is domiciled in the host country of the project. A parastatal being another
name for a state-owned enterprise. Since the dataset combines both foreign and local sponsors,
the following steps were undertaken to determine whether or not a project has the participation
of local sponsor(s):
1. check the country of origin or incorporation of the sponsor. If this country is the same as
the host country of the project, then a value of 1 is recorded against the project, indicating
the presence of local sponsor, otherwise a value of 0 is recorded.
2. if the country of the sponsor is not available in the ’Sponsors’, field, a search is made using
the name of the indicated sponsors for the project on Google and other websites, including
that of the sponsor, to get information on the sponsor’s country of incorporation. Once this
determination is made, the appropriate value is then assigned against the project.
Fiscal Control Variables
Following the extant literature, as well as the joint World Bank and International Monetary
Fund (IMF) debt sustainability framework for low and middle income countries, public debt
burden is captured through stock/solvency and flows/liquidity indicators. The solvency indicator
that is often used is the public and publicly guaranteed (PPG) debt as a percentage of nominal
GDP (DstockGDP). The World Bank also uses present value (PV) of debt in order to account for
the level of concessionality in loans given to especially IDA-only countries. According to the World
Bank, Public and publicly-guaranteed external debt comprises long-term external obligations of
the public sector, including the national government, political subdivisions (or an agency of either),
and autonomous public bodies, and external obligations of private debtors that are guaranteed
for repayment by a public entity. For the liquidity indicator, the study uses external debt service
payments as a percentage of exports of goods and services (DSerExp).
Macroeconomic and Market Control Variables
The macroeconomic and market control variables are put into two groups:
1. Pricing group - this includes inflation and exchange rates, which are variables that directly
affect the pricing of the PPP output. Inflation (Infl.) is measured by consumer price index
(CPI), while exchange rate (ExRate) is a measure of a country’s currency relative to the
United State dollars. The CPI measuring price change from the perspective of the purchaser.
2. The output demand group - This includes GDP per capita (GDPPC) and population (Popn)
of the country where the project is implemented.
Political Control Variables
As a way of capturing political instability in countries that are implementing PPPs, the study
utilises the variable, political stability and the absence of violence (PSAV). This variable is an
index compiled by the World Bank (in the world governance indicator database), which ranks
countries in ascending order of better political stability and absence of violence.
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Appendix IIC:
Robustness checks
We note that BOT to BOO projects have similar structures, except mainly for the ownership of
the residual facility - they both bundle project construction with operation under a concession
agreement that stipulates the period over which the public sector is obligated to assure the recuper-
ation of the investment of a private sector partner. However, our results may be model dependent
(see Ho et al., 2007). Therefore, to check the robustness of our results, we utilise the Propensity
Score Matching (PSM) approach (see among others, Abadie and Imbens (2006)). Our analysis
for creating a matched sample is conducted using theMatchIt package in the R-Programming
language (Ho et al., 2011). Our results using the matching approach are qualitatively similar to
those reported in the paper. Briefly, using the matched dataset, we find that the odds for BOO
projects experiencing the event of failure are about three times (e1.0489 = 2.854) that of BOT
projects, corroborating results from Model 2. We also find both size and sector variables to be
highly significant, with small size projects and projects in the Energy sector having comparatively
lower risk of failure.
As a further robustness test, we consider two additional PPI Sub-types. The first PPI sub-type
is Rehabilitate, Operate and Transfer (ROT), under which the public sector owns both the initial
as well as residual facilities of the project, while the second is Merchant (Mct), which captures
total facilities ownership by the private sector. The latter is usually considered as a pure private
sector venture where the private sector partner assumes nearly all the risks and rewards associated
with the project. The aim, therefore, is to see whether the risk of failure is lower for both ROT
and BOT projects compared to BOO and Mct. A total of 492 ROT projects and 230 Mct projects
were used in the analysis. Briefly, our results from the Kaplan-Meier non-parametric discrete-time
survival function, indicate that both PPI Sub-types that allocate ownership of residual facilities
to the public sector (BOT and ROT), have higher survival probabilities than those for which
the private sector retains residual ownership (BOO and Mct). The restricted mean shown in
Table 10 indicates that ROT and BOT projects have a similar restricted mean year of survival
of approximately 26 years, while BOO and Mct have approximately 22 and 20 years of survival
respectively.
Table 10: Restricted Mean of the Four PPI Sub-types (based on Propensity Score Matched
sample)
Number of
PPI Sub-types Observations *rmean *se(rmean)
Build, Own and Operate (BOO) 629 21.6 0.701
Build, Operate and Transfer (BOT) 1370 25.5 0.175
Merchant (Mct) 230 19.7 0.694
Rehabilitate, Operate and Transfer (ROT) 492 25.2 0.288
* restricted mean with upper limit = 27
These further confirm that the conferment of residual facilities ownership to the public sector
reduces the risk of PPP project failure.
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SUPPLEMENTARY APPENDIX
Figure 6: Kaplan-Meier Result for Regional Grouping
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Figure 7: Kaplan Meier Result for Primary Sector Grouping
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